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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 1

A.

Nature of the Case.

This appeal arises following a bench trial for breach of contract and lien foreclosure
initiated by McCarthy Corporation ("McCarthy) against Craig Stark and Stark Investment Group,
LLC (collectively "Stark"). At trial, Stark counterclaimed for breach of contract, slander of title
and breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. The underlying dispute arose from a contract
between McCarthy and Stark whereby McCarthy promised to perform the groundwork necessary
to construct a storage facility near Rathdrum, Idaho (the "Project"). The gravamen of the dispute
involved the design, use and decision to close an on-site borrow pit that was intended to be a
source of structural fill material and, in tum, a repository for stripped topsoil and the repercussions
the decision had on the project. Upon closing the borrow pit, McCarthy made a unilateral decision
to begin hauling fill material from an off-site reject pit located several miles from the Project
without Stark's knowledge and without a written change order. McCarthy's decision led to a
billing dispute over material cost and a dispute as to whether certain quantities of fill material
had, in fact, been delivered and used on the Project.

II
II

Respondent provides necessary facts to establish background context for disputed facts in accord
with I.A.R.35 (b )(3). As in Appellant's Brief, the Clerk's Record is cited as "R." The Reporter's
Transcript will be cited as "Tr. Vol I." and "Tr. Vol II.," respectively. Trial Exhibits are cited as
"Ex." The transcript for Jason Cheyne's testimony is condensed and, therefore, is cited as follows:
[record page]: [transcript page]: [line].
1
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B.

Statement of Facts.

Craig Stark owned the subject property and was acting as his own general contractor on
the Project. Tr. Vol L 60:5-60: 10. Prior to purchasing the property, Stark contracted with h2
Surveying & Engineering ("h2") to provide certain professional services including preparation of
an initial site topographic survey; preparation of a site disturbance plan; assistance in obtaining a
Conditional Use Permit ("CUP") and preparation of the project plans and specifications (herein
"Plans"). Ex. 91. h2 engineer, Scott McArthur ("McArthur"), acted as the project design engineer
for Stark. Id.; Tr. Vol IL 861:14-861:18. In this role, McArthur often undertook implicit tasks of
coordinating with subcontractors and resolving disputes between subcontractors. McCarthy's
project supervisor, Jason Cheyne ("Cheyne") testified that these tasks are typical of a design
engineer on a project. Tr. Vol L 75:18-78:5.
In early F ebmary 201 7 and prior to his employment with McCarthy, McArthur introduced
Craig Stark to Cheyne, whom McArthur knew to be an experienced excavator. Tr. Vol IL 834:20835 :8. After the introduction, and in anticipation of bidding the project, Cheyne offered and
undertook to dig four (4) test holes on the project site free of charge. Tr. Vol IL 840:22-842:15.
The purpose of digging these test holes was to assist McArthur in completing the project design,
including his calculation of the estimated unit quantities for bid items like stripped waste (Bid
Item 3) and structural import material (Bid Item 4). Id.; Tr. Vol L 51:6-52:10. As Cheyne knew,
McArthur used the data provided by him from the test holes to calculate the estimated unit
quantities for those bid items. Tr. Vol II. 840:22-842:15; Ex. A, p. 4. After digging the test holes,
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Cheyne was asked to submit a bid for the groundwork needed to undertake the Project. Tr. Vol
IL 844:20-844:23.
On March 30, 2017, Craig Stark and Cheyne signed a document titled: "Stark RV & Boat
Storage-Phase 1 Contract Exhibit 'A"' that estimated a total unit price construction cost of
$413,551.54 ("Contract Exhibit 'A"'). Ex. 5, p. 4; Ex. A, p. 4. McArthur initially prepared the
document by including the Estimated Units. Tr. Vol IL 558:1-558:15. Cheyne then provided the
Unit Price and Item Price for each Bid Item based on the Estimated Units. Tr. Vol L 16:64:716:64: 10. After Cheyne and Stark signed Contract Exhibit "A," McCarthy Construction added a
three-page document prepared by counsel titled: McCarthy Construction Contract (collectively
the "Contract"). Id.; Ex. 5, p. 1-3.
The Contract included a provision for change orders containing the following language:

Change Orders. Contractor agrees to verbal change order provided the amount does not
exceed $1,000.00 in value; the change order amount is emailed to the Owner, and the
Owner accepts the change order amount by email or writing. The parties agree that any
change order exceeding $1,000 in value shall be signed by Owner and delivered to
Contractor.
Ex. A, p. 1 (emphasis added). This agreed upon change order provision was important to Stark
because it allowed him to manage the project budget and keep control over additional costs. Tr.
Vol IL 686:22-687:6. Importantly, Cheyne knew that Stark had to sign any change order for
additional costs exceeding $1,000.00. Tr. Vol IL 71:281:1-71:281:6.

II
II
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The following three Bid Items frame the dispute between the parties.
Bid Items
Stripped Waste Material ...
Import/Suitable/Structural Material
(compacted in place) ...
19 4" compacted base rock ...
crushed/angular
rock
(placed
compacted)

3
4

¾"
and

Estimated
Units
18,878 CY
15,602 CY

Unit
Price
$2.50
$4.03

Item Price

2,867 Ton

17.70

$50,571.50

$47,195.69
$62,877.67

Ex. 5, p. 4; Ex. A, p. 4. As noted, McArthur provided the Estimated Units and Cheyne submitted
the bid Unit Price and Item Price which was accepted by Stark. Tr. Vol IL 840:22-848:21; Tr. Vol
I. 15:60:21-17:65.11.

With regard to the three bid items, the contemplated sequence of construction was for
McCarthy to first strip the waste material (Bid Item 3) from the project site; then McCarthy was
to place and compact structural fill material (Bid Item 4) mined from the on-site borrow pit to
meet the required design elevation. Tr. Vol I. 17:68:12-18:69:15. Once this design elevation was
met, McCarthy would place and compact four (4) inches of¾" crushed rock (Bid Item 19)
required as the subbase for three (3) inches of asphalt (Bid Item 18). Ex. 5; Ex. A.
To undertake the groundwork, McCarthy subcontracted with Basin Industrial Services,
Inc., a Montana corporation owned and operated by Rick Tabish (herein "Basin" or "Tabish"). Tr.
Vol I. 23:90:4-23:92:7. Acting for McCarthy, Cheyne entered into oral agreement-a hand-shake
deal--with Tabish whereby Tabish promised to complete the work under Bid Items 3 and 4 for
$2/CY estimated at $60,000.00. Tr. Vol I. 23:90:22-23:92:7. There was no dispute that Basin was
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not a registered Idaho contractor. Tr. Vol II. 474:6-474:9.
Based on their oral agreement, beginning in April 2017, Basin undertook excavation work
on the Project at the direction of Cheyne. Tr. Vol L 25: 100: 17-26:101 : 1. For its excavation work,
McCarthy paid Basin the sum of $60,000.00 in accord with the terms of the oral agreement
between Cheyne and Tabish. Tr. Vol IL 4 77: 11-477: 19. However, following the work, Basin billed
McCarthy a total sum of $138,670.16 and claimed to be owed a remaining balance of $78,670.16.
Ex. EE. Notably, McCarthy never paid Basin its claimed balance of$78,670.16. Tr. Vol IL 274:9274: 19.2
The Plans Stark submitted in support of the issued CUP called for raising the project site
to a specific design elevation. Ex. 116, 117, 118. The intent was that this would be done by mining
and placing structural fill from the borrow pit until this design elevation was met. Tr. Vol II.
846:10-847:6. Since McCarthy and Basin had the Plans, they knew the required and designed
project elevations. Tr. Vol IL 844: 14-844: 19; 400: 18-400:20 McCarthy also knew that once the
site was brought up to the required and planned design elevation, h2 would perform a topographic
survey to calculate the quantity of the structural fill (Bid Item 4) compacted in place. 3 Tr. Vol IL

At trial, McCarthy abandoned $70,976.36 from the amounts McCarthy was claiming under the
Amended Claim of Lien. Tr. Vol IL 274:9-274: 19. McCarthy did not explain how the $70,976.36
was deducted from the invoiced amounts McCarthy alleged as the basis for the Amended Claim
ofLien. Id.
The parties contemplated that the actual quantity of material stripped, placed and compacted
would be measured by topographic survey. Tr. Vol IL 948:6-949:25. Stark initially hired h2 to
undertake a site topographic survey prior to stripping waste material. Tr. Vol IL 854:18-855:20;
PL Ex. 93. After McCarthy stripped the waste material, it hired h2 to undertake a topographic
survey to quantify the volume of stripped waste material (Bid Item 3). Tr. Vol L 51 :202:22
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948:2-949:25.
Once McCarthy commenced work on the Project, it submitted pay invoices to Stark with
itemized charges based on the Bid Items outlined in the Contract. Tr. Vol II. 435: 14-438: 15. Stark
reviewed each invoice to verify the work had been completed before submitting the invoice to
US Bank for payment. Id. In sum, Stark made the following payments to McCarthy:

Invoice#
2409
2435
2481
2488

Date Paid
4/18/17
5/22/17
7/17/17
9/22/17

Amount Paid
$38,200.00
$112,725.77
$62,955.80
$49,339.99
Total: $263,221.56

Ex.X.
With regard to the Bid Items that frame the dispute, Stark paid, in full, the estimated
engineering quantities for Bid Items 3, 4 and 19 as follows:

Invoice 2435
Bid Item
Description
Hrs./Items
18,878
Stripped waste material ...
3
4
Import/suitable/structural material. ..
15,602

Amount
2.50004
4.20011
Total:

Rate
$47,195.69
$65,530.08
$112,725.77
Paid 5/22/18

17.70206
Subtotal:

50,751.80
50,751.80
Paid 7/17/17

Invoice 2481
Bid Item
19
4" compacted base rock ...

2,867

Ex. P, Q, R, X, Y, Z, AA.

51:202:22; Def. Ex. 94.
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On or about May 18, 2017, Basin closed the borrow pit. Tr. Vol L 72:286:1-72:286:25. At
the time, Basin's superintendent, Jessie Durland, thought Basin had mined, placed and compacted
the amount of structural fill material (Bid Item 4) needed to meet the required and planned project
elevation. Tr. Vol L 73 :289:3-73 :289:22. However, that was not the case. Id.
On May 24, 2017, McCarthy hired h2 to re-stake the building comers. Ex. 95. After the
building comers were re-staked, Cheyne realized the site was nowhere near the required and
planned elevation. Tr. Vol IL 992:4-993:24. However, despite this material discovery, Cheyne
never contacted Stark to tell him that the borrow pit was closed, or otherwise explain how that
decision would impact the Project. Tr. Vol L 40:160:9-40:160:13; Tr. Vol IL 686:22-687:6. 4
Rather, Cheyne made the unilateral decision to begin hauling material characterized and referred
to as "rejects" from an old material pit he knew was located several miles to the north of the
Project, referred to as the "Swartout Pit". Tr. Vol L 73:290:12-73:290:21. To bring the site up to
the design elevation, Cheyne hauled, placed and compacted reject material from the Swartout Pit.
Tr. Vol L 73:290:12-73:290:21. At trial, it was shown that Cheyne chose to do so without: (a)
communicating his decision to Stark; and (b) without obtaining a signed change order. Tr. Vol
L 40:160:9-40:160:13; Tr. Vol IL 710:18-711:4.

II

"Q;
A:
4

Did you communicate with Mr. Stark that you intended to import material from off-site?
No, I didn't. I didn't call him and tell him. There were e-mail chains. There were text
messages that were sent that I thought everybody was on the same page." Tr. Vol L
40: 160:9-40: 160: 13.
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At trial, Cheyne (and Robert McCarthy) claimed to have received authorization from
McArthur to begin hauling reject material from the Swartout Pit via a text message from Stark
that McArthur had forwarded to Cheyne. Tr. Vol I. 129: 6-14; Ex. 1-F. However, as shown at trial,
this claim was plainly contradicted by the language and obvious reference to Phase II of the
Project found in Cheyne's text to McArthur that had been forwarded to Stark. Ex. 96-G; 1-F. As
McArthur and Stark testified, they understood Cheyne's message and reported concern about a
lack of structural fill from the borrow pit was in regard to completion of the "other end" in
reference to Phase II and not Phase I of the Project. Id. Tr. Vol II. 708:3-711:4; Tr. Vol II. 857:4859:5. As McArthur testified, there were viable on-site options to obtain structural fill material
as opposed to hauling reject material from the Swartout Pit. Tr. Vol II. 863:3-864:20; Tr. Vol II.
934:4-937:24; Tr. Vol IL 1002:8-1002:16.
Following its efforts to haul and place reject material from the Swartout Pit to meet the
required and planned site elevation, McCarthy hired h2 to undertake a topographic survey for the
purpose of quantifying Bid Items 3 and 4. Ex. 60, Ex. JJ. On July 21, 2017, McArthur reported
the results of h2 's survey work via email to Rob McCarthy, Jason Cheyne, and Craig Stark, as
follows:

Bid
Item
3
4
4

Description
Strippings
Onsite Borrow
Rejects

Amount

Note

21,475 CY
13,353 CY 11,922 CYx 1.12 conversion = 13,353 CY
3,584 CY 3,200 CY x 1.12 conversion= 3,584 CY

Ex. JJ, Ex. 60.
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McArthur's email plainly notes that the 3,200 CY of "reject" material was a quantity
provided by McCarthy and not independently verified by h2. Id. Indeed, at trial, it was shown
that the truck count total and total yardage reported by the reject material supplier, Harmony Land
Company, to Cheyne was a total of 3,156 CY. Tr. Vol IL 1049:13-1051:8; Ex. XXXX-2.
Accordingly, the reject quantity reported by Cheyne to McArthur was higher than the actual
quantity reported by Harmony Land Company. Id. Cheyne knew and intended for McArthur to
rely on his reported reject quantity. Id.
While McCarthy would accept h2's survey data and McArthur's reported quantity for
"Strippings," it would nevertheless reject and contest h2's survey data and McArthur's reported
quantity for "Onsite Borrow" despite McArthur's reasoned explanation that the combined total
of 16,937 CY for "Onsite Borrow" and "Rejects" fell within 1 percent of h2's calculated and
estimated unit total of sub-grade structural fill material required for asphalt. Id.; Tr. Vol IL 876: 1880: 13.
Therefore, in August 2017, Basin commissioned a covert survey ostensibly for the
purpose of quantifying the "Onsite Borrow" and refuting McArthur's reported quantity. Tr. Vol
IL 479: 18-480:4; Ex. KK-2. Being covert, the survey was completed at night and under the cover
of dark. Tr. Vol IL 887:6-887: 11. Despite its covert efforts, Basin's survey and reported data were
shown to deviate less than 0.5% from McArthur's reported quantity and, therefore, Basin's survey
data did not refute McArthur's reported quantity-Basin's survey data confirm it. Tr. Vol IL
887:20-891:10. McArthur's reported quantities for "Onsite Borrow" (11,922 CY) and "Rejects"
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(3,200 CY) showed that a total of 15,122 CY of structural fill, compacted in place, was the total
structural material placed on site. Ex. 60, JJ. Notably, this combined quantity is less than
McArthur's estimated unit quantities found in the Contract. Ex. A, p. 4.
The dispute that gave rise to this litigation began on July 25, 2017, when Stark received
McCarthy Invoice #2488 in the total amount of $158,980.00. Ex. R. This Invoice included a
single, line-item charge for $107,520.00 described as follows:

Bid Item
19

Invoice 2488 - 7/25/17
Description
Hrs./Items
4" compacted base rock ...
3,548

Amount
30.00

Rate
$107,520.00

Id.
Following receipt of this Invoice, Stark called McCarthy to request a correction because
Stark thought the $107,520.00 charge was an obvious error based on the fact that he had already
paid McCarthy $65,530.08 for 15,602 CY of import material (Bid Item 4) and $50,751.80 for 4
inches of¾" crushed base rock (Bid Item 19). Ex. P, Q. Despite Stark's request, McCarthy
refused to address or correct the Invoice. Tr. Vol IL 436:2-438: 15. Rather, McCarthy told Stark to
pay the Invoice and they would revisit the charge later. Id.; Tr. Vol II. 722:12-723:15. Because
McCarthy was unwilling to correct, discuss or document the $107,520.00 charge, Stark was
unwilling to pay the Invoice until the charge was explained and documented. Id. In part, because
US Bank required accurate invoicing before processing a pay request, Stark did not want to
submit an erroneous Invoice for payment. Id.

II
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As shown at trial, at the time McCarthy issued Invoice #2488, Robert McCarthy knew
that the Starks were financing the Project through a construction loan with US Bank. Tr. Vol IL
460:11-460:20; Ex. 39, 43. As shown, following the issuance oflnvoice #2488, McCarthy sought
to coerce the Starks into paying the full amount of the Invoice despite conceding the Invoice was
erroneous. Tr. Vol II. 299:21-299:23. Given McCarthy's background in hard-money lending,
McCarthy knew US Bank would pressure the Starks to pay the disputed invoices and, thereby,
McCarthy would put the Starks in a financial pinch. Tr. Vol II. 294:3-294:8; Tr. Vol II. 454:3460:20. As shown, the Starks were in a financial pinch because, on one hand, McCarthy was
demanding that they pay for materials already paid for, while, on the other hand, US Bank was
pressuring the Starks to resolve the billing issue with McCarthy or risk funding for the Project.
Tr. Vol II. 458:1-458:18.
From July 25, 2017 through August 22, 2017, Stark communicated with McCarthy in an
effort to resolve the billing dispute and alleviate the tightening financial pinch. Tr. Vol II. 454:3460:20. Despite meetings between Stark, McArthur, Cheyne, and McCarthy over this time,
McCarthy never produced any supporting documentation to Stark or McArthur to support the
disputed billing amount.. Tr. Vol II. 435:11-438:15; Ex. 76, 111.
On August 22, 2017, McCarthy issued Invoice #2504 in the amount of $121,620.55 to
Stark. Ex. S. By this time Stark was feeling the financial pinch and, therefore, Stark agreed to
meet with McCarthy on that day for the purpose of resolving the billing dispute and paying
McCarthy monies that Stark did not think he owed. Tr. Vol II. 458:19-460:24. However,
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McCarthy chose not to meet with Stark as promised. Tr. Vol IL 728: 1-728: 18. Instead, on August
23, McCarthy sent Stark revised Invoice #2488 in the total amount of $238,986.98. Tr. Vol IL
458: 19-460:24; Ex. T.
To increase the financial pinch, on August 22, 2017, McCarthy emailed Stark demanding
50% of the asphalt costs ($99,403.33) based on the representation that its paving subcontractor
was requiring this up-front deposit. Ex. 81; Ex. T.

However, as McCarthy knew, its paving

subcontractor had never actually requested that McCarthy or Stark pay any amounts upfront.
Tr. Vol L 74:295:25-74:296: 14. The request for up-front money was Cheyne's idea to coerce
the payment of monies from Stark which both Cheyne and McCarthy knew was a lie. Id.
Thereafter and beginning on August 22, 201 7, McCarthy would make a total of five (5) revisions
to Invoice #2488. Ex. R, S, T, U, V, W. McCarthy's revisions were made both pre and posttermination and are summarized as follows:
McCarthy Invoice 2488 Revisions:
Revision No.
Original
1
2
3
4
5

Invoice#
2488
2504
2488
2488
2488
2488

Date on Invoice
7/25/2017
8/22/2017
7/25/2017
9/1/2017
9/1/2017
10/11/2017

Date Received
7/25/2017
8/22/2017
8/23/2017
9/1/2017
9/11/2017
10/23/2017

Amount
$158,980.00
$121,620.55
$238,986.98
$162,087.56
$145,706.56
$176,691.71

Ex.'s 109, R, S, T, U, V.
On August 23, 2017, following the receipt of McCarthy's revised Invoice #2488 in the
amount of $238,986.98, Stark felt as though they had no choice but to terminate McCarthy to
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complete the Project and avoid financial harm. Tr. Vol IL 480:5-483:3. From July 25 through
August 23, McCarthy had made no meaningful attempt to resolve the billing dispute and had
undertaken to delay completion of the work remaining to finish the Project. Id. Therefore, on
August 25, 2017, Stark terminated McCarthy. Ex. 109. After the termination, Stark informed
McCarthy, they would pay for all verified work completed and owed under the Contract. Ex. 84.
On September 22, McCarthy recorded its original Claim of Lien in the amount of
$145,706.56 and in the exact same amount found in McCarthy's post-termination revision no. 4.
Ex. CC, V. On September 22, Stark paid McCarthy the sum of $49,339.99 based on the receipt,
through counsel, of post-termination revision no. 4. Def. Ex. 111, 112. In making the payment,
Stark explained to McCarthy the basis for the payment by itemizing those billing items that were
disputed, in whole or in part, from those that were not disputed. Id.
Despite the receipt of this payment, on October 23, 2017, McCarthy recorded an Amended
Claim of Lien in the increased amount of $176,691.71 and in the same amount as found in
McCarthy's post-termination revision no. 5. Ex. W, DD. Notably, McCarthy had not undertaken
any new work since its termination back on August 25. Tr. Vol IL 275:8-275:11. Despite having
performed no new work on the Project, the Amended Lien was a net increase of $30,985.15
($176,691.71-$145,706.56) above the original lien amount. Ex. CC, DD. However, the gross
increase was $80,385.14 calculated as: [$30,985.15 increase] plus [$49,399.99 paid]. Tr. Vol II.
525:4-525: 11.

II
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As a result of McCarthy's recorded lien, Stark was required to modify the terms and
conditions of their loan with US Bank. Ex. H, I, J, K. In addition to a loan modification
agreement, Stark was required to deposit the sum of $265,037.55 ($176,691.71 x 1.5%) into a
bank controlled, non-interest-bearing account to secure US Bank against McCarthy's lien. Ex. I,
K. In addition, Stark had to agree to defend and indemnify US Bank in the ensuing litigation. Tr.
Vol II. 787:23-788:3. All these fees could have been avoided had McCarthy not recorded its liens
against Stark's Property. Tr. Vol II. 778: 19-783: 16. Indeed, Gavin Mobraten, a US Bank employee
who is intimately familiar with US Bank's investment opportunities, averred that an investment
account would have conservatively afforded a 5- 7% return on investment had Stark not been
forced to deposit the sum in a non-interest-bearing-account. Tr. Vol II. 783:22-784:20.
At trial, it was notable that McCarthy's office manager, Chelsea Thomas, testified that
McCarthy allocated at least seventeen (17) cost invoices totaling $31,772.96 from unrelated jobs
to the total expense incurred on the Stark Project. Tr. Vol I. 91 :364:21-93 :3 71: 10; Tr. Vol II. 136: 1153: 1; Ex. AAA, RR, SS, TT, UU, VV, WW, XX, YY, ZZ, AAA, BBB, CCC, DDD, EEE, FFF.

Despite this job cost allocation toward the Stark Project, McCarthy nevertheless realized a 44.6%
profit on the Stark Project. Tr. Vol II. 156:18-156:22, 158:22-159:14; Ex. NN, 00.
Following McCarthy's termination on August 25, Stark proceeded with the construction
work necessary to complete the Project. Tr. Vol II. 543:13-543:25. Stark contracted Waldo
Construction, Inc. ("Waldo") to complete the groundwork and with North West Road and Drive
to provide the asphalt work. Id.; Tr. Vol IL 544: 1-548:24. In addition, Stark had to come out-of-
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pocket and incurred other costs to complete the scope of McCarthy's work. Id. In sum, Stark
spent $209,261.68 hiring Waldo Construction, Inc.,5 North West Road & Drive, 6 H2 Surveying,
LLC, 7 Allwest Testing & Engineering, 8 Northwest Linings & Geotextile Products, Inc.,9 PSP
Enterprises, Inc., 10 R&B Concrete, 11 and Conmat, Inc. 12 to complete the Project. Tr. Vol IL
543: 13-558: 13.
The Project was scheduled to be completed no later than September 15, 2017. Tr. Vol II.
539:25-540:20; Tr. Vol IL 561 :6-562:2. However, as shown at trial, McCarthy intentionally
delayed work, like the paving, as part of its effort to coerce the Starks to pay Invoice #2488. Ex.
79. As a result of McCarthy's conduct, the Project completion was delayed for approximately
three months and cost the Starks $38,586.78 in lost rent. Ex. 1111, KKKK; Tr. Vol II. 562:2565:12.13
Following the project's completion, Stark and US Bank intended to convert the Stark
construction loan to a conventional loan. Tr. Vol II. 761 :6-761 :9. However, as a result of

5

Ex. VVV, WWW.
Ex. RRR, SSS, TTT, UUU.
7
Ex. XXX, YYY.
8
Ex. ZZZ, AAAA.
9
Ex. FFFF, GGGG.
10
Ex. DDDD, EEEE. (Total PSP Enterprises, Inc. invoice amount is $856.00. Stark did not seek the
two additional wheel stops $202.00) which were built and installed at the request of Stark and not
included in the original McCarthy Construction contract.
11
Ex. BBBB, CCCC (Total R&B Concrete invoice amount is $6,997.00. Stark only sought the
proportion of the work included in the Invoice and McCarthy Construction contract ($6,997.00 $1,166.00-$836.00 = $4,995.00 X 520/580)).
12
Ex. HHHH.
13 The District Court did not award Stark damages for lost rent.
6
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McCarthy's recorded liens and action to foreclose Stark was required by US Bank to extend the
construction loan twelve months, from October 12, 2018 until October 7, 2019. Ex. J, H, L; Tr.
Vol IL 772:23-772: 11; Tr. Vol IL 775: 17-776:2. US Bank charged Stark the costs incurred by US
Bank in connection with this extension, in the sum of $7,596.70. Ex. M, N. These costs include
defense and indemnification costs in the amount of $4,646.70, appraisal costs in the amount of
$2,050.00, and inspection fees in the amount of $900.00. Id. US Bank required Stark to continue
paying 5.5% interest on the construction loan until the construction loan was converted to a
conventional loan during McCarthy's continued delays- a sum of$51,469.79. Tr. Vol II. 760: 15760:24. As of the date of trial, Stark still had not converted the construction loan to a conventional
loan and would continue to incur fees and interest charges until the McCarthy lien was released.
Tr. Vol IL782:3-782:24.

II.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Pursuant to contract, Stark is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal. The Contract
provides:
If a party initiates an arbitration or judicial action, including an appeal, as to the
interpretation or enforcement of this agreement, including remedies upon default, the
substantially prevailing party shall be entitled to reimbursement of its reasonable attorney
fees and costs.
Ex. 5, p. 2, ,-r 8 (emphasis added). In addition, Stark is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. See Idaho Code§ 48-608. Accordingly,
should Stark prevail on appeal, they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, the Court will not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
I.R.C.P. 52(a). Appellate review of the decision of the trial court is limited to ascertaining
whether substantial, competent evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings
of fact support the conclusions of law. Crea v. Crea, 135 Idaho 246, 16 P. 3d 922 (2000);

Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P. 3d 263 (2000). When an action is tried to a court
without a jury, determinations as to the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their
testimony, its probative effect and inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are all
matters within the province of the trial court. Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho
738, 9 P. 3d 1204 (2000). The trial court's findings of fact will be liberally construed in favor
of the judgment entered. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 23 P. 3d 147 (2001). This Court
exercises free review over conclusions oflaw. Smith v. J.B. Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937, 941,
908 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1996).
IV.

ARGUMENT

Following a 6.5 day trial, the District Court, having heard the evidence and having
weighed

the credibility of the witness testimony, found that: 1) Stark was entitled to

$51,760.83 for its breach of contract claim; 2) McCarthy's Claim of Lien was without basis
and must be removed; 3) Stark was awarded $34,100.46 for its Idaho Consumer Protection
Claim; and 4) Stark, as the prevailing party, was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The
District Court also found Stark to be the prevailing party and, therefore, awarded Stark
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attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $133,969.33. R. at 653-655. For the reasons
set forth herein, the District Court's decision should be affirmed because McCarthy's appeal
is really just asking this Court to second-guess the District Court's findings in favor of Stark.

A.

The District Court Did Not Err in Concluding that McCarthy Corporation
Failed to Establish that it Is Owed Monies for Labor, Materials, and Services
Provided for the Project.

McCarthy argues that the District Court erred in concluding that McCarthy failed to
establish that it was owed monies for labor, materials, and services provided for the Project.
Appellant's Brief, p. 26. However, as the District Court found, McCarthy failed to meet its burden
of proof of this point.
1. McCarthy Corporation Failed to Establish That it is Owed Monies for the Six Items.
McCarthy focuses on six items which it contends the evidence at trial showed it was owed
money, albeit in a much lesser amount than asserted in its recorded liens. 14 In asking this Court
to overturn the District Court's decision, McCarthy relies on one portion of McCarthy's
testimony. 15

Id. However, fatal to McCarthy's argument, McCarthy failed to prove that

McCarthy completed any of those six items for which it was seeking payment. Tr. Vol I, 224:16234:15; Ex. 111, 121, 124. Cheyne, the on-site project foreman, testified that at least one of these

$500.00 for 6" SDR Storm Pile
$4,740.00 for dry utility trenching
$2,500.00 for final mobilization payment
$1,000.00 for the balance of compaction testing
$330.00 for 4" compacted base rock
$500.00 for septic permit and test holes. Appellant's Brief, p. 26.
15
Appellant's Brief, p. 26 (citing to Tr. Vol I. at 224:16-234:15; Ex. 111, 121, 124).
14
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6 items was not completed. Tr. Vol L 61:242:2-61:242:18. Cheyne testified he "has no idea"
whether the 4 inch compacted base rock was placed under the sidewalks. Id. Therefore, at trial,
McCarthy failed to provide any credible evidence that McCarthy was owed any of the monies it
was claiming by its many revised invoices and its Amended Claim of Lien. Tr. Vol II. 230:7230: 17; Ex. V; Ex. 110; Tr. Vol IL 236:16-239:25; Ex. 113; Ex. W.
Unlike McCarthy, Stark testified and provided credible evidence that contradicted Mr.
McCarthy's assertions that the alleged 6 items were completed. Tr. Vol II. 435:11-449:17; Ex.
T, T-1. Indeed, Stark was able to provide testimony that explained the basis upon which he
disputed the line-item charges found in the McCarthy invoice upon which it was claiming
payment, including the 6 items raised on appeal. Tr. Vol IL 494:16-517:7; Ex. 111. Although
Stark sought documentation from McCarthy to resolve disputed billing issues prior to litigation,
even at trial, McCarthy could not provide the requested documentation in support of its claims.
Tr. Vol II. 300:13-300:21; Tr. Vol IL 224:16-234:15. Ostensibly, that is because no
documentation existed. As the record shows, while McCarthy would take Stark's $49,339.99 final
payment, McCarthy would refuse to apply it in the manner Stark applied it by letter to McCarthy
and against any specific unit items being billed to Stark. Tr. Vol IL 269:17-274:8; Ex. DD. As
Stark testified, he hired Norm Waldo to complete the work McCarthy failed to complete on the
Project. Tr. Vol IL 543:13-545:20; Ex. VVV.
Having considered the testimony, the District Court weighed the evidence and found as
follows:
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McCarthy did less to clarify what he was owed and why, and more to confound
the issue for the trier of fact. When comparing the testimony of Stark to the
testimony of Rob McCarthy, the [District] Court finds the former to be more
credible and convincing than the latter. This is especially so when considering
Stark's testimony as to the line by line items in Exhibit T and T-1. Therefore, the
[District] Court finds that McCarthy has not met its burden of proof of presenting
substantial and competent evidence that it was owed any further sums by Stark.
R. 491-492.
Upon liberally construing the facts in favor of the judgment entered, this Court should
defer to the District Court's findings on this issue as they are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685 (2001); Estate ofSkvorackv. Sec. Union

Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 19 (2004).
2. McCarthy Failed to Establish that it is Owed Monies for Structural Material.
McCarthy argues that it is owed monies for material and hauling charges incurred by
hauling reject material from the Swartout Pit. Appellant's Brief, p. 26.

However, at trial,

McCarthy failed to prove it was owed any monies arising from its unilateral decision to haul reject
material from the Swartout Pit. This is because McCarthy could never prove that the reject
material that was hauled and compacted in place exceeded McArthur' s estimated unit quantity
for structural fill material and because Stark had already paid McCarthy for those estimated unit
quantities.
As noted, the Contract contemplated that certain estimated material unit quantities (i.e.
Bid Items 3, 4, and 19) would be quantified based on topographic survey. As McCarthy knew,
Bid Items 4 and 19 were estimated unit quantities and estimated unit price based on those
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materials being compacted in place. Accordingly, McCarthy intended to rely on topographic
survey or survey data to quantify these materials compacted in place as opposed to relying on
truck load counts or truck tickets because neither could provide a compacted in place
measurement of the material. Ex. A, p. 4.
At trial, it was notable that Stark proved he had paid McCarthy for Bid Items 3, 4 and 19.
Ex. 69. At trial, Stark proved that he paid Bid Item 3 or 21,475 CY of"Strippings" as part of the
final $49,399.99 payment. Ex. 69; Ex. P; Ex. 111. As Stark also proved, Stark had paid Bid Item
4 or 15,602 CY compacted in place "Rejects" and "Onsite Borrow" based on the engineer's
estimated unit quantity and unit price. At trial, McArthur explained the basis for his calculations
and conclusion that McCarthy had only compacted in place the total sum of 15,122 CY of
"Rejects" and "Onsite Borrow" which was less than the 15,602 CY Stark had paid for. Ex. 69;
Ex.P.
Notably, on rebuttal, Cheyne would attempt to distance McCarthy from the 3,200 CY
"Reject" quantity he had previously provided to McArthur in an attempt to undermine
McArthur's calculations and his credibility. Tr. Vol II. 956:13-958:4. However, on crossexamination, Cheyne had to concede he did not "estimate" the 3,200 CY quantity as he had
previously testified; but that, in fact, he had relied on the actual yardage reported to him by
Harmony Land Company. Tr. Vol IL 1049:13-1049:24. 16 This put the District Court in the best

"Q: And it was provided to you and it gave you, actually, a truck count total and a total of the
yardage, and the yardage that was reported to you was 3,156 cubic yards, wasn't it?
A:
Yes." Tr. Vol II. 1049:20-24.
16
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position to weigh the credibility of the testimony it heard from both McArthur and Cheyne
regarding material calculations and, in particular, the amount of structural fill that was compacted
in place.
B.

The District Court did not Err in Concluding that McCarthy Corporation
Breached the Parties' Contract.

The District Court correctly concluded that McCarthy breached the Contract by failing to
obtain a change order for the additional fill and by violating the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing for its deceptive invoicing practices. R. 487-489. After liberally construed the facts in
favor of the judgment entered, this Court should defer to the District Court's findings on this
issue as it is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Beard, at 685; Estate of
Skvorack, at 19.
1. Stark Did Not Waive the Change Order Provision as it Pertains to the Import
Material Because Stark did not Know McCarthy was Importing Material From
the Swartout Pit.

The Contract plainly states: :
Change Orders. Contractor agrees to verbal change order provided the amount
does not exceed $1,000.00 in value; the change order amount is emailed to the
Owner, and the Owner accepts the change order amount by email or writing. The
parties agree that any change order exceeding $1,000 in value shall be signed
by Owner and delivered to Contractor.

Ex. A, p. 1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, any change exceeding $1,000 in value had to be
signed by and delivered to Stark.
As shown, Cheyne knew the Contract required a change order signed by Stark for any
change in value over $1,000. Tr. Vol I. 71:281:1-71:281:6. This was evidenced by the fact that
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Cheyne sent Stark a change order for several items that deviated from the original Contract. Ex.
74. Stark reviewed, commented, and signed the change order as contemplated by the Contract.

Id. Despite this knowledge Cheyne failed to request a change order or even discuss with Stark
his unilateral decision to haul reject material from the Swartout Pit. Tr. Vol IL 516:21-517:2.
Indeed, Cheyne's prior representations to Stark were that the on-site borrow pit had plenty of
structural fill material available to complete Phase I and that Stark would, in fact, have enough
fill material to begin placing it over Phase 2 of the Project. Tr. Vol IL 603:13-604:20. Yet when
Cheyne first purportedly discovered that was not the case-after Bison's decision to close the
borrow pit--Cheyne inexplicable failed to contact Stark and inform him of this material
development. Tr. Vol IL 603:7-603:12.
Under the circumstances and based on the evidence, it is not surprising that the District
Court would conclude that a " ... change order was necessary as McCarthy had changed the area
from which it was obtaining import material, and the amount of the material was far in excess
of what was contemplated under the Contract." R. at 488. Nevertheless, McCarthy argues that
a change order was not necessary because Stark waived the change order provision.
Appellant's Brief, p. 27-31. However, McCarthy fails to explain or otherwise point out any
evidence that would suggest the District Court's conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
A.

Neither McArthur nor Stark Waived the Change Order Provision.

McCarthy argues that Stark or McArthur, acting as Stark's agent, waived the change
order provision in the Contract. Appellant's Brief, p. 29-31. Although the District Court
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concluded that McArthur did act as an agent of Stark at certain times in his capacity as the
design engineer on the Project, the District Court correctly found that the scope of the agency
relationship did not eliminate the contractual requirement of a change order following
Cheyne's unilateral decision to begin hauling reject material from the Swartout Pit. R. at 10.

Id.
Notably, as Cheyne knew, McArthur had estimated that the on-site borrow pit had
sufficient structural material to bring Phase I up to the proper design elevation. Tr. Vol II.
849: 17-849:21. In fact, after Basin began mining structural fill material from the borrow pit,
Cheyne told Stark that the borrow pit had enough material to bring Phase 1 up to design
elevation and that there would be enough material to begin placing structural fill material over
the Phase 2 site. Tr. Vol II. 603: 13-604:20. Cheyne's physical observations and representations
corroborated McArthur's material estimates. Tr. Vol IL 856:17-856:23.
Interestingly, beginning in May 2017, Cheyne stopped communicating regularly with
Stark about the status of the Project, including the placement of fill material. Tr. Vol IL 582:15586:20. At trial, Cheyne testified that on or about May 19, 2017, he contacted McArthur by text
message for the purpose of telling him that he anticipated running short of structural fill material
at the borrow pit. Tr. Vol IL 857:24-858:24; Ex. 1-F. However, at trial, McArthur specifically
refuted Cheyne' s asserted testimony that Cheyne had, in fact, contacted him for the purpose of
telling him that there was not enough material in the on-site borrow pit to bring Phase 1 to the
design elevation. Id. Indeed, as McArthur testified, it was not until after Cheyne had already
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hauled the reject material from the Swartout Pit that Cheyne first contacted him about structural
fill material. Id.
McArthur' s testimony was easily corroborated by Cheyne' s own text message which
plainly stated:
We are running way over the 15,000 yards at Starks ... There isn't close to enough borrow
to fill the other end.
Ex. 1-F (emphasis added). As McArthur testified, he understood Cheyne' s use of the phrase "the
other end" to mean Phase 2, which was planned to be constructed on the far end of the project
property and in succession to Phase 1. Ex. 117; Tr. Vol IL 826:10-827:1. As shown at trial,
McArthur forwarded Cheyne' s text message to Stark commenting:
Last night Jason said he was concerned after we staked the buildings that he might not
have as much material to build phase 2 as he thought.
Ex. 96G, p. 3 (emphasis added). Stark responded by text message:
10-4... As long as there is enough phase-2 rock area to give us a good layout for steel
delivery we should be fine.
Id.

Like McArthur, Stark testified that he understood Cheyne's text message and his reference to
"the other end" as meaning Phase 2 and, therefore, he understood the borrow pit would provide
the structural fill material needed to complete Phase 1. Tr. Vol IL 860: 11-860:21.
Notably, McCarthy can cite no documentation in the Record that would corroborate
Cheyne or McCarthy having communicated to Stark or McArthur that there was a lack of
structural material in the borrow pit needed to complete Phase 1 at any time prior to Cheyne' s
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unilateral decision to begin hauling reject material from the Swartout Pit. 17 Both Stark and
McArthur reasonably expected Cheyne to contact them if, in fact, the borrow pit lacked the
structural material needed to complete Phase 1. Tr. Vol IL 861 :20-862:22. Indeed, McArthur
testified that such a change would be substantial and would change the dynamics of the Project
plans. Id. As McArthur pointed out, had Cheyne reported to him a concern about a shortfall of
structural material from the borrow pit, the property was large enough to expand the scope of the
CUP to mine structural material from another borrow pit on-site. Tr. Vol IL 863:3-864:8. In fact,
Cheyne suggested to McArthur the idea of mining additional fill material from the other side of
a seasonal creek running through the property. Tr. Vol II. 934:4-934: 12.
Although McCarthy argues that Stark waived the change order provision, a waiver "will
not be inferred from the parties' conduct absent 'a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an
intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel. "' Pocatello Hosp. v. Quail Ridge

Med. Inv'r, 156 Idaho 709, 719, 330 P.3d 1067, 1077 (2014) (quoting Knipe Land Co., 151
Idaho at 457, 259 P.3d at 603). As demonstrated, McCarthy has failed to show any facts on
the record that would meet this threshold. McCarthy's reliance on Stark's decision to pay for
certain verified quantities of Bid Items unrelated to this dispute was not a clear and unequivocal
act that manifested an intent by Stark to waive the contractual change order provision as a whole
and as it applied to the Bid Items that are the subject matter of the litigation. Indeed, Cheyne knew

Each of the text messages referenced in Respondent's Brief makes no reference to Phase 2 or
explains the change from importing rock from the borrow pit to importing rock from an off-site
location. Respondent's Brief, p. 30.
17
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a change order was required under the Contract and Cheyne had, in fact, sent a change order on
other Bid Items to Stark for signature. Ex. 74. This fact cuts against any alleged inference of an
alleged waiver by Stark.
As the Record shows, the District Court considered the evidence and testimony at trial.
Accordingly, the District Court was in the best position to weigh the evidence and the credibility
of Cheyne, McCarthy, Stark, and McArthur on this issue. The District Court properly concluded
that, while McArthur was acting as an agent for Stark as the design engineer at times during the
Project, the evidence nevertheless supported a finding that a change order was still necessary to
bind Stark to the alleged increased costs incurred by Cheyne's unilateral decision to haul reject
material from the Swartout Pit. In addition, the District Court correctly found that McCarthy
failed to meet its burden and show that McArthur' s later knowledge regarding Cheyne' s unilateral
decision operated to modify the Contract. Further, even assuming arguendo Stark waived the
change order provision, McArthur' s material calculations proved that Stark had paid McCarthy
the agreed upon unit price for all the structural material compacted in place. Therefore, a liberal
construction of the facts in favor of the judgment entered by the District Court demonstrates
the District Court's findings on this issue are supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Beard, at 685; Estate ofSkvorack, at 19.

2. The Trial Court's Conclusion that McCarthy Corporation Breached the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is Supported by the Record.
The District Court correctly concluded that McCarthy breached the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing by its conduct, including over-billing Stark; failing to negotiate
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the billing error; demanding payment for work not yet completed; and recording an amended
lien in an increased amount after receiving Stark's payment. R. at 489. In Idaho, the "implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied by law in the parties' contract."

Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750 (2000) (other citations omitted).
The covenant "arises only regarding terms agreed to by the parties." Taylor v. Browning, 129
Idaho 483, 490 (1996) (citing Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266,
288 (1991)). The covenant "requires that the parties perform, in good faith, the obligations
imposed by their agreement .... " Idaho Power Co., 134 Idaho at 750.
As the record shows, McCarthy began travelling down the road of bad faith when it
issued its original Invoice #2488. McCarthy knew that, prior to July 21, 2017, Stark had paid,
in full, McArthur's estimated unit amounts for topsoil stripping (Bid Item 3); structural fill
(Bid Item 4); and¾" base rock (Bid Item 19). Ex. 0, P, Q, X, Y, Z, AA. Yet on July 25, 2017,
Stark received Invoice #2488 with a single line item charge for 4" compacted base rock in the
amount of $107,520.00. Ex. R. Stark recognized the invoice contained an obvious error and,
therefore, he made multiple requests that McCarthy correct the invoice. Tr. Vol II. 736:15738: 13. Incredulously, rather than correct the invoice, McCarthy would repeatedly tell Stark
to "just pay it." Tr. Vol II. 637:7-637: 14; Tr. Vol IL 436:23-438: 15. Stark attempted for months
to obtain a correct invoice with supporting documentation. Ex. 79, p. 2. Yet despite the obvious
error, McCarthy continuously rejected Stark's efforts. Tr. Vol II. 539: 11-539:24. Instead of
simply providing Stark with a corrected invoice, McCarthy began to slow-walk the Project and
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told Stark that it was holding up the scheduled paving on the Project until Stark paid Invoice
#2488. Tr. Vol II. 725:6-725:18; Tr. Vol I. 75:297:11-75:298:5; Tr. Vol II. 485:1-485:13; Ex.
80.
As the evidence at trial showed, instead of correcting the obvious billing error in
Invoice #2488, McCarthy would prepare and submit to Stark a series of amended invoices
without the supporting documentation requested by Stark. Ex. R, S, T, U, V. As McCarthy
testified, the revised invoices were purportedly based on negotiated sums between McCarthy
and Stark, as opposed to actual, quantifiable sums based on work completed by McCarthy. Tr.
Vol I. 193:11-198:2. Although McCarthy knew the invoice was erroneous, it nevertheless
continued pursuing payment based on the amount invoiced as opposed to the work completed.
Tr. Vol I. 208:25-209:8.
To further frustrate Stark, the evidence at trial showed that McCarthy knowingly lied
to Stark about its paving subcontractor demanding payment up front. The evidence showed
that McCarthy had requested Stark pay up-front fifty percent of the paving costs because
"asphalt is requesting it." Ex. 81; Ex. T. However, the paving subcontractor, Northwest Road
and Drive (i.e. asphalt) never requested that McCarthy or Stark pay any amounts up-front. Ex.
A; Tr. Vol I. 74:295:25-74:296: 14. This request proved to be Cheyne's ill-thought idea. Tr.
Vol I. 74:295:25-74:296:14. At trial, McCarthy attempted to backpedal from such a demand
or otherwise billing Stark for "to be completed" items by suggesting that it was done at Stark's
recommendation. Tr. Vol II. 198:17-198:19. However, when deposed prior to trial, McCarthy
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"did not know" why the "to be completed" items were on Invoice #2488. Tr. Vol I. 257:22261 :25. This evidence further corroborated and proved that McCarthy was acting in bad faith
toward Stark by trying to compel payment for monies that McCarthy was not owed.
Further, and perhaps most notably, on September 22, 2017, McCarthy recorded a Claim
of Lien against Stark's property in the amount of $145,706.15. Ex. CC. On October 5, 2017,
Stark, through counsel, paid $49,339.99 for the line items that Stark did not dispute. Ex. 111.
Incredulously, rather than reducing the amount of the lien by the $49,339.99 paid, on October
23, 2017, McCarthy filed an Amended Claim of Lien in the amount of $176,691.71 - a
$30,985.15 net increase in the claimed lien amount despite the fact that McCarthy had not
worked on the Project since August 25, 2017. Ex. DD. McCarthy's recordation of its Amended
Claim of Lien evidenced McCarthy's dogged determination to financially pinch Stark and,
thereby, coerce the payment of monies McCarthy was not owed.
In considering the totality of the facts and evidence presented, the District Court
correctly concluded that Stark had proved that McCarthy was not acting in good faith so as to
allow Stark to receive the benefit of the Contract. R. at 489. Based on evidence at trial, the
District Court's decision was well founded and based on substantial, competent evidence and,
therefore, should be affirmed.

C.

The District Court did not Err in Finding that McCarthy Engaged in
Conduct that Violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

The ICPA provides:
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The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared to be
unlawful, where a person knows, or in the exercise of due care should know,
that he has in the past, or is . . . Engaging in any act or practice which is
otherwise misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer.
LC. § 48-603(17). The purpose of the ICPA is "to protect both consumers and businesses against
unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce, and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection." LC.
§ 48-601; White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 890 (2004). The ICPA should be liberally construed..

Fenn v. Noah, 142 Idaho 775, 779-80 (2006) (citing In re W Acceptance Corp., 117 Idaho 399,
401 (1999)).
The District Court correctly concluded that McCarthy violated the ICPA on two accounts.
The first, by creating and submitting misleading and false invoices that were intended to deceive
Stark into paying more money than was contractually owed. The second, by McCarthy requiring
monies up-front for paving when the paving company made no such request. 18 R. at 494-95. The
record supports both findings.
As discussed above, on July 25, 2017, McCarthy sent Stark its original Invoice #2488
with an erroneous $107,520.00 charge. Ex. R. Stark was surprised at the charge because Stark
had already paid McCarthy, in full, for all the estimated structural fill material. Ex. 0, P, Q. Stark
repeatedly told McCarthy he needed the invoice to be corrected so Stark could submit it for

The District Court found that McCarthy did not violate the ICPA by bullying McArthur into
siding with McCarthy in order to get paid on the Stark Project. R. at 494.
18
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prompt payment. Ex. 76. However, McCarthy never provided Stark with any documents to
support the charge or the amount of the invoice. Instead, McCarthy issued a series of four
revisions to Invoice #2488; each for a different sum and with different material description,
quantity, and rate; and all without supporting documentation. Ex. R, S, T, U, and V. While the
invoices would change, as the evidence showed, McCarthy was seeking to coerce payment from
Stark in an amount greater than what was owed.
As the evidence at trial showed, both McArthur's topographic survey data and the "nighttime" survey commissioned by Basin confirmed that the structural fill material compacted in
place was below the engineer's estimated unit amount and, therefore, Stark had paid McCathy,
in full, for the structural material having paid the unit price for that material. Tr. Vol IL 507: 18513: 15; Ex. JJ, KK-2. Despite McCarthy's conduct, Stark continued to make good faith efforts
to determine what monies McCarthy was owed so Stark could issue prompt payment for those
undisputed or partially disputed items. Ex. 111. Stark's efforts were not reciprocated. Indeed,
as the evidence showed, McCarthy incredulously recorded its Amended Claim of Lien in an
amount greater than its original lien although (a) it had undertaken no work since its termination;
and (b) after Stark had tendered payment of nearly $50,000 for the work Stark did not dispute.
Ex. CC, DD, 111. As Stark showed, McCarthy's motive was plain enough to decipher because
McCarthy knew that Stark intended to bond around a lien and, therefore, it would be more
financially burdensome for Stark to bond around a larger lien amount. Tr. Vol II. 353:17-353:24.
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As Stark argued, it showed McCarthy's intent to put Stark in a financial pinch for the purpose of
coercing the payment of monies Stark did not owe.
Second, as discussed supra, McCarthy emailed Stark to request up-front payment for 50%
of the paving costs because "[a]sphalt is requesting it." Ex. 81. As Stark proved, this statement
was knowingly false and, in fact, a lie intended to induce Stark into paying monies Stark did not
owe. Thus, the record supports the District Court's conclusion that McCarthy engaged in acts
or practices which were false, misleading, and deceptive to Stark and in violation of the ICPA.
R. at 494-496. Therefore, the Court should affirm the judgment.

D.

The District Court's Award of Damages for Lost Interest is Supported by
Substantial Evidence.

Under the ICPA, a consumer is entitled to all ascertainable losses suffered from an
unlawful act as defined by the chapter. LC. § 48-608(1 ). The District Court correctly concluded
that McCarthy violated the ICPA, and thus Stark was entitled to all "ascertainable losses" suffered
as a result. R. at 495-496. Particular to McCarthy's claim on appeal, the District Court awarded
Stark a sum of $26,503.76 as lost interest from Stark being forced to deposit $265,037.55 in a
non-interest bearing and bank controlled account due to McCarthy's Amended Claim of Lien. R.
at 496. In doing so, the District Court accepted the testimony of Gavin Mobraten ("Mobraten"),
a banker at US Bank, 19 who testified that Stark could have received a reasonable rate of return in

Mr. Mobraten is the vice president and commercial banking manager at US Bank, N.A. Tr. Vol II.
753:15-753:17. Mobraten is the commercial loan officer for the Stark loan with US Bank and has
been a banker in various capacities since 1997 - or for approximately 24 years. Tr. Vol II. 755:20755:24. Mobraten testified that he is familiar with U.S. Bank's investment opportunities available to
19
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the range of 5-7% by investing in a money market account. Tr. Vol II. 784:12-784:17. The
District Court's finding is supported by substantial and competent evidence and the weight given
to the testimony of Mobraten.
As the evidence at trial showed, US Bank required Stark to deposit $265,037.55
($176,691.71 x 150%) into a non-interest bearing account controlled by US Bank so the bank
could pay off McCarthy's lien if it so chose. Tr. Vol II. 768:7-771:4; Ex. I; Tr. Vol II. 773:7773: 19. From November 2017 until trial, Stark did not earn any interest on the $265,037.55
deposited in the bank-controlled account. Tr. Vol II. 770:15-771:4.
Mobraten testified that Stark could have deposited the bond money in two different US
Bank investment opportunities; one being a certificate of deposit (or "CD") and the other being
an investment in an "investment account." Tr. Vol II. 784: 1-784:20. Mobraten testified a CD was
giving a negligible return on investment at that point in time. Id. Whereas, an investment account
would have expected a conservative rate of return in the range of 5-7%. Id. It is important to
note that, by its damage award, the District Court did not give Stark a windfall. In exercising its
discretion, the District Court awarded Stark 5.0% interest, as opposed to the higher range of that
suggested by Mobraten's testimony. R. at 496. Accordingly, from the date of deposit, through
November 10, 2019, Stark could have received $26,500.00 in interest on the $265,037.55 it was
required to deposit into the bank controlled account. 2

° Frankly, where the $265,037.55 came

its customers. Tr. Vol. II. 783 :22-783 :25.
The District Court accepted the lower range ofMobraten's testimony and calculated the exact
figure for lost interest of depositing $265,037.55 at a 5.0% interest rate for an exact sum of

20
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from had no bearing on the fact that Stark could have, and should have, realized interest on that
sum of money. By its conduct, McCarthy had Stark in a financial pinch and had effectively
undermined any investment options upon recordation of its Amended Claim of Lien.
The District Court, having considered Mobraten's experience in the finance industry,
exercised its discretion and accepted Mobraten's testimony that Stark should have realized 5.0%
interest on the sum of $265,037.55 which Stark was required to deposit into a bank controlled
account as security against McCarthy's Amended Claim of Lien. Thus, the District Court properly
awarded Stark the sum of $26,503.76 which reflected the lost interest opportunity on the
deposited sum. R. at 490. The amount was not speculative and the award was supported by
reasonable and competent evidence and, therefore, should be affirmed.

E.

The District Court did not Err in Awarding Stark Attorney's Fees.

The District Court found Stark entitled to an award of attorney's fees. R. at 497-498.
McCarthy argues the District Court abused its discretion in awarding Stark reasonable attorney's
fees for two reasons: (1) because defense counsel did not apportion its fees as between Stark and
US Bank; and (2) because defense counsel did not apportion its fees between the Stark's claims.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 42-45).

II
II

$26,503.76, as opposed to Mobraten's calculation of $26,500. R. at 496; Tr. Vol II. 786:8786:11.
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1.

Stark Properly Segregated Out the Attorney's Fees Incurred by Stark
Amongst the Attorney's Fees Incurred by US Bank, N.A., and Stark
Investment Group, LLC.

McCarthy argues that the District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Stark
because Stark "failed to segregate out the fees amongst the jointly represented
defendants/counterclaimants." Appellant's Brief, p. 42. Particularly, the joint representation
of Stark, Stark Investment Group, LLC, and US Bank, N.A. Id. While McCarthy asserts that
the District Court abused its discretion, McCarthy does not explain how the District Court
abused its discretion. Notably, McCarthy fails to acknowledge and otherwise consider that (1)
all three Defendants prevailed against McCarthy; and (2) each Defendants' role in this
litigation.
An award of attorney fees is "within the discretion of the trial court and subject to
review for an abuse of discretion." Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway
Dist., 148 Idaho 688,694 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 712 (2009)).
The party disputing the award of attorney fees has the burden of showing an abuse of
discretion. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington Fed. Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 525 (2001).
In support of its argument, McCarthy relies heavily upon the decision in Hackett v.
Streeter, 109 Idaho 261 (Ct. App. 1985). However, the Court of Appeals' reasoning in the
Hackett decision is not applicable to the facts in this case. In Hackett, the plaintiffs sued a
subdivision developer and a contractor for negligent construction of a subdivision water
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system and the same attorney represented both defendants. Id. at 262-63. While the contractor
was found liable for the negligent construction of the water system, the developer was not
found liable. Id. at 263-264. The attorney for the defendants sought to recover the entire
amount of attorney fees incurred in defending the lawsuit on the ground that his prevailing
client and his non-prevailing client had agreed to be jointly and severally liable for his attorney
fees and, therefore, there was no means for him to separate his time and costs for each client.
Id. The only information the attorney provided in support of the requested fee award was his
hourly rate and the total number of hours he expended in the case. Id. at 264. Under those
circumstances, the trial court, when faced with the choice of awarding fees to both the
prevailing and non-prevailing defendants or not awarding any fees, chose not to award any
fees. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed stating, "we believe it is incumbent upon a
party seeking attorney fees to present sufficient information for the court to consider factors
as they specifically relate to the prevailing party or parties seeking fees." Id.
Contrary to Hackett, all three Defendants prevailed in this action. R. at 481-499. In
addition, this Court has declined to strictly construe Hackett to mandate segregation of
attorney's fees incurred by jointly represented prevailing defendants. Taylor v. Riley, 162
Idaho 692, 708 (2017). In Taylor, this Court affirmed the district court's apportionment of
fees between two defendants - one entitled to attorney's fees and one not-without segregating
said fees. Id. at 707-709. This Court has noted the economic benefit that arises from jointly
representing defendants. Id. Certainly, in this case, the defendants received the economic
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benefit from the joint representation. Under the circumstances, Taylor is more applicable to
this case.
Like Taylor, the District Court awarded only Stark $129,434.00 his attorney's fees. 21
R. at 653. The District Court's decision is well supported by the record. This case centered
around a Contract between Stark and McCarthy Corporation. 22 Ex. A. McCarthy and Stark
filed competing breach of contract claims against one another regarding a fairly complex
material quantities dispute. R. at 14-29, 32-46; Tr. Vol IL 1065:22-1066:8. Stark Investment
Group, LLC, wholly owned by Craig and Michelle Stark, was named in its limited capacity as
owner of the Property being foreclosed against. 23 R. at 5:18:23-5:19:10. US Bank played an
even more ancillary role, named solely for the purposes of McCarthy asserting a lien priority
over US Bank's recorded Deed of Trust. R. at 14-29. The District Court, after weighing the
evidence of the claims involving each party at trial, elected to award Stark attorney's fees.
Nothing on the record shows that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding Stark
his fees, while declining to award fees to Stark Investment Group, LLC, and US Bank, N .A.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision.

All three Defendants timely filed a memorandum of costs and attorney's fees for the sum of
$144,780.83. R. at 500-586; 611-615. At the District Court's request, US Bank's fees were parsed
out from Defendants' amended memorandum of costs and attorney's fees. R. at 634; 640-652.
The District Court further declined to award Stark Investment Group, LLC, fees. R. at 634.
22
Under the Contract, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs.
(Ex. A).
23
The only claim pursued against Stark Investment Group, LLC, was for Foreclosure of
Mechanic's Lien, LC. § 45-501. R. at 17.
21
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2.

Stark Properly Segregated Out the Attorney's Fees Incurred amongst
Stark's Claims to Support the District Court's Attorney's Fees Award.

McCarthy does not argue that Stark is entitled to attorney's fees and costs both under
Idaho Code § 12-120(3), and Idaho Code § 48-608(5). Appellant's Brief, p. 43. Instead,
McCarthy argues the District Court erred in its apportioning of attorney's fees. Id. Again,
McCarthy's argument ignores the landscape of this litigation.
Stark does not dispute that a party who successfully defends against a lien foreclosure is
ordinarily not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. However, that alone does not preclude an
award of attorney's fees and costs. R. at 630. An award of attorney's fees under LC.§ 12-120(3)
is allowable if a commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Brooks v. Gigray

Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 78 (1996); Id. The test is whether a commercial transaction is (1)
integral to the claim; and (2) constitutes the basis of the party's theory of recovery. Sims v

Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980 (2015).
As the District Court found, the gravamen of this case boiled down to competing breach
of contract claims - with McCarthy and Stark mutually asserting that the other breached the
Contract. R. 630-633; R. at 14-46. If McCarthy prevailed on its breach of contract claim against
Stark, McCarthy's lien would be foreclosed. If Stark prevailed on his breach of contract claim,
Stark would be entitled to judgment. The arguments and defenses for all claims presented at trial
were essentially the same. As the record reflects, the same or similar facts, damages, and defenses
appear throughout the District Court's memorandum decision on each claim presented at trial. R.
at 481-499. Thus, the District Court awarded Stark attorney's fees and costs. Id.
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McCarthy avers that a blanket denial of Stark's fees is appropriate, citing to Rockefeller
v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 645 (2001). Appellant's Brief, p. 44.

McCarthy's reliance on

Rockefeller is misguided. In Rockefeller, the Court analyzed the gravamen of the claims to

determine if the prevailing counterclaimant was entitled to an award of attorney's fees.
Rockefeller, at 644. The counterclaimant asserted breach of fiduciary duty both as a defense, and

a counterclaim.

Id.

Although the Court noted the counterclaimant' s claim arose from a

commercial transaction, it determined that the gravamen of the action was the tort claim, for
which a prevailing party is not entitled to attorney's fees. Id. at 645. As such, the Court declined
to award fees because it was unable to apportion fees for the ancillary claim entitled to fees. Id.
As discussed supra, the opposite is true in this case.
McCarthy's assertion that the District Court erred because Stark did not apportion
attorney's fees between claims is belied by the District Court's analysis on that exact issue. The
District Court properly found that the gravamen of this case entitled Stark to an award of
attorney's fees under both LC. § 12-120(3) and LC. 48-608. Therefore, the District Court's
decision should be affirmed.

V.

CONCLUSION
As Stark proved, McCarthy engaged in both overt and covert conduct that was intended

to economically coerce Stark into paying McCarthy monies that it was not owed. McCarthy
knowingly and intentionally put Stark in a financial pinch for the purpose of coercing payment
for McCarthy's financial gain and to Stark's financial detriment. Regardless of the descriptions
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or labels used to describe McCarthy's conduct, it was wrong; it was made in bad faith; and it was
intended to financially punish Stark. By its appeal, McCarthy merely asks this Court to secondguess the District Court's decision. As Stark has shown, just as McCarthy failed to meet its burden
of proof at trial, it also fails to show how the District Court abused its discretion or committed an
error of law that would require a reversal of the District Court's reasoned decision.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2020.
RAMSDEN, MARFICE, EALY & DE SMET, LLP

Isl Michael A. Ealy
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Michael A. Ealy, Of the Firm
Attorney for Respondents
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I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of December , 2020 I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Jonathon D. Hallin
Lukins & Annis, P.S.
601 E. Front Ave., Ste. 303
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814

U.S. Mail
_
Overnight mail
Hand Delivered
_
Facsimile (208) 664-4112
_ X_ ICourt Electronic Portal
Ghallin@lukins.com)

Isl Jennifer Escruceria

Jennifer Escruceria
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